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Patent Harmonization, Protectionism and Legislation
Abstract

This essay raises questions about the Patent Harmonization Treaty. addressing the overall direction of
harmonization in this country and the processes that are being applied to the harmonization effort. Section I
of the essay compares the underlying goals of patent harmonization with those of the current United States
patent system. The article contends that the legal rules relating to patents in this country evidence a specific
intent to promote domestic industry. The aims of harmonization, in contrast, are fundamentally different. To
be valid, then, patent harmonization may require a basic shift in the social consensus in this country
concerning the use of patents. Section II examines the lawmaking processes that WIPO has used to arrive at
the current text of the Patent Harmonization Treaty. The essay concludes that when viewed from the
perspective of the national interests of the United States, WIPO's mechanisms have been neither careful nor
inclusive. Section III addresses the general feasibility of using legislative lawmaking methods to define the law
of patents in this country. It argues that proper efforts to legislate harmonization are likely to be difficult and
time consuming. The great majority of the current law of patents in the United States is the result of significant
common law development. Recent legislation relating to patents has shown that legislated rules of patent law
often have unintended effects. The current harmonization effort, moreover, is much more comprehensive than
any patent legislation we have attempted to date. As a result, there are substantial reasons to decline the
opportunity to design a harmonized set of patent laws through legislation.
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Essay: Patent Harmonization,
Protectionism, and Legislation
R. Carl Moy*

INTRODUCfION

E

fforts have been ongoing for nearly a decade in the latest efforts
to harmonize l the patent laws of the world. 2 For the United States,
the decisional point on whether to join in that effort is drawing near.
The Paris Union 3 is in the final stages of negotiating a multilateral
treaty that will harmonize the law of patents within signatory coun• Assistant Professor, William Mitchell College of Law; Of Counsel, Merchant, Gould, Smith,
Edell, Welter & Schmidt, P.A. The author would like to thank Amelia Buharin and Amy Itoku
for their research assistance.
1 Generally speaking, "harmonization" of legal systems refers to coordinating the various rules
of law in the subject systems to the point where they express common, minimum principles. In
this sense, harmonization can be contrasted with the more exacting ideal of "unification" of the
law which, in its pristine form, refers to the use of the same legal rules in each system. See
generally, e.g, David, Rene, The International Unification of Private Law, 2 International Encyclopedia of Comparative Law, ch. 5, 34-35 (1971).
2 The current efforts before the World Intellectual Property Organization (hereinafter "WIPO")
to arrive a treaty on patent law harmonization began at least as early as 1983. See Note, Committee
of Experts on the Extension of a Grace Period, 1984 Indus. Prop. 313; Kirk, M., WIPO's
Involvement in International Developments, 50 Albany L.J. 601, 602 (1986) (hereinafter "Kirk")
(asserting that WIPO harmonization efforts grew originally out an effort to coordinate the operations of the United States Patent and Trademark Office ("PTO"), the Japanese Patent Office,
and the European Patent Office). The creation of international standards for the protection of
patents has also been a subject in the Uruguay Round of the negotiations concerning the General
Agreement of Tariffs and Trade ("GATT"). See generally, the sources cited infra, n.58.
In broad terms, however, patent harmonization as been an objective of portions of the international patent bar since the 1870's. See 1 Ladas, S.P., Patents, Trademarks and Related RightsNational and International Protection, 59-68 (1974) (hereinafter "Ladas"); Penrose, E., The
Economics of the International Patent System, 42-59 (1951) (hereinafter "Penrose").
3 The Paris Union consists of the states that are members of the various forms of the Convention
for the International Protection of Industrial Property ("Paris Convention"). Leaffer, M.A.,
International Treaties on Intellectual Property, at 563-64 (1990) (hereinafter "Leaffer"). The
Paris Union has itself created WIPO to administer the Paris Convention, replacing the former
United International Bureau for the Protection of Intellectual Property ("BIRPI") in 1967. Leaffer, at 563-64; See The Convention Establishing the World Intellectunl Property Organization,
WIPO Pub. No. 251, reprinted in Leaffer, at 566 (hereinafter "WIPO Convention").
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tries (hereinafter the "Patent Harmonization Treaty"). 4 Officials of
the United States, as well as representatives of private organizations
based in the United States, have participated in those negotiations. 5
Legislation has been introduced in the United States that would au4 See Draft Treaty Supplementing the Paris Convention for the Protection of Industrial Property
As Far As Patents Are Concerned (Patent Law Treaty), WIPO Doc. No. PLT/DC/3 (1990)
(hereinafter "Basic Proposal"). For discussions of the Patent Harmonization Treaty overall, see
generally Fiorito, E.G., Hannonization of u. S. and Worldwide Patent Laws, 73 JPTOS 83 (1991)
(hereinafter "Fiorito"); Pagenberg, J., The WIPO Patent Hannonization Treaty, 19 AIPLA Q.J.
1 (1991) (hereinafter "Pagenberg"); and Fryer III, W., Patent Law Hannonization: The Current
Situation and Alternatives Available (pts. 1 & 2), 72 JPTOS 242, 298 (1990) (hereinafter "Fryer
III"). WIPO itself refers to the treaty as the "Patent Law Treaty." See, e.g., id.; History of the
Preparations of the Patent Law Treaty, WI PO Doc. No. PLT/DC/5 (1990) (hereinafter "WIPO
History"). Those in the United States, however, have referred to it most commonly as the "Patent
Harmonization Treaty."
The treaty has been the subject of a series of meetings before WIPO of the "Committee of
Experts on the Harmonization of Certain Provisions of Law for the Protection of Inventions."
See generally WIPO History, WIPO Doc. No. PLT/DC/5, at par. 4. In general, eleven preparatory
meetings have been held, including an initial meeting that was limited to consideration of issues
relating to the use of a "grace period" before filing. A listing of those meetings is provided
below, along with citations to the Notes summarizing each that have appeared in WIPO's monthly
publication, Industrial Property:
Prior meeting on
grace period
1st Session
2nd Session
3rd Session
4th Session
5th Session,
part 1
part 2

1984 INDUS. PROP. 313
1985
1986
1987
1988

INDUS.
INDUS.
INDUS.
INDUS.

PROP.
PROP.
PROP.
PROP.

267
309
204
179

6th Session
7th Session
8th Session,
part 1
part 2

1989 INDUS. PROP. 269
1990 INDUS. PROP. 140
1990 INDUS. PROP. 297
1991 INDUS. PROP. 41

1988 INDUS. PROP. 358
1989 INDUS. PROP. 53

The member states of the Paris Union were to finally approve the treaty at a Diplomatic Conference
in June 1991. At that time, however, authorities from various member states indicated that their
governments would not approve of the treaty as it then existed. This included the United States
insisting that it be allowed the option of retaining its first-to-invent theory of priority. See, e.g.,
Statement of the Hon. Harry Manbeck, Commissioner of Patents and Trademarks, Joint Hearings
on S. 2605 and H.R. 4978 Before the Senate Subcommittee on Patents, Copyrights and Trademarks and the House Subcommittee on Intellectual Property and Judicial Administration of the
House and Senate Committees on the Judiciary, 102d Cong., 2d Sess. (April 30, 1992) (hereinafter "Statement of Manbeck"); Remarks of M. Kirk at AIPLA Spring-Stated Meeting (May
2, 1991) reprinted in 1991 AIPLA Bull. 442, 443-46 (April-June) (hereinafter "Remarks of
Kirk"); Bardehle, H., The WIPO Hannonization Treaty and the Grace Period, 1991 Indus. Prop.
372 (hereinafter "Bardehle"). Final approval by the Paris Union is now awaiting "the prospect
of reaching a compromise on the diverging positions of the Paris Union member states." Bardehle,
1991 Indus. Prop. 372. Legislation has been introduced before the United States Congress in an
effort to help provide such prospects. See infra, n.6. The proceedings at the diplomatic conference
are summarized at 1991 Indus. Prop. 360.
.
5 An exact listing of the participants appears at the various WIPO meetings in the Notes
summarizing each meeting. See supra, nA, and the text, infra, accompanying nn.86-107.
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thorize fundamental changes in the law of patents in this country
upon harmonization. 6 Many people knowledgeable in patent law believe that harmonization is an idea whose time has come. 7
Yet, many of those interested in the United States patent system
view harmonization with reactions that range from skepticism to hostility. 8 Segments as diverse as small-inventor groups9 and research
universities lO are opposed to the concept. Former Commissioner of
Patents and Trademarks Donald Banner has adamantly criticized some
aspects of the harmonization effort.11 The patent bar itself is by no
6 s. 2605, lO2d Cong., 2d Sess. (1992); H.R. 4978, lO2d Cong., 2d Sess. (1992); See
generally, e.g., 138 Cong. Rec. S5226-01 (introducing S. 2605); 44 PTCJ 3 (May 7, 1992)
(summarizing testimony at joint hearing on S. 2605 and H.R. 4978).
7 See, e.g., Statement of Manbeck, supra, n.4; Statement of H. Wegner, Joint Hearings on S.
2605 and H.R. 4978 Before the Senate Subcommittee on Patents, Copyrights and Trademarks
and the House Subcommittee on Intellectual Property and Judicial Administration of the House
and Senate Committees on the Judiciary, 102d Cong., 2d Sess. (April 30, 1992) (hereinafter
"Statement of Wegner"); Statement of the American Intellectual Property Law Association, Joint
Hearings on S. 2605 and H.R. 4978 Before the Senate Subcommittee on Patents, Copyrights and
Trademarks and the House Subcommittee on Intellectual Property and Judicial Administration of
the House and Senate Committees on the Judiciary, 102d Cong., 2d Sess. (April 30, 1992)
(delivered by Robert Benson) (hereinafter "Statement of the AIPLA ").
8 Remarks of J. DeGrandi at the AIPLA Spring-Stated Meeting (May 2, 1991) reprinted in
1991 AIPLA Bull. 645 (July-Sept.); Donald Banner, Address to the American Bar Association
Section of Patent, Trademark and Copyright Law at its Annual Meeting (August 12, 1991)
(references to this organization are hereinafter abbreviated as .. ABA-PTC"); George Clark, Statement to the ABA-PTC Annual Meeting on Resolution 102-1 (August 10, 1991), reprinted in
ABA-PTe, 1990-91 Annual Report, at 73; Douglas Wyatt, Statement to the ABA-PTe Annual
Meeting on Resolution 102-1 (August 10, 1991), reprinted in id. at 68; Statement of Douglas
Wyatt, Joint Hearings on S.2605 and H.R. 4978, Before the Senate Subcommittee on Patents,
Copyrights and Trademarks and the House Subcommittee on Intellectual Property and Judicial
Administration of the House and Senate Committees on the Judiciary, lO2d Cong., 2d Sess. (April
30, 1992) (hereinafter "Statement of JJYatt").
9 See, e.g., letter from Esther S. Smith on behalf of the Association of Technology Business
Councils to Rep. Bentley (R-Md.) (Sept. 25, 1992) (criticizing first-to-file recommendation of
the Advisory Commission on Patent Law Reform); Robert Toole, President, United Inventors
Association of the United States of America, Statement to the Technology Transfer Task Force
of the Republican Research Committee, (Sept. 29, 1992) (same); America's Greatest Asset Under
Siege, Invention Connection 1 (Aug. 1992) (asserting SBA study in April, 1992, to have found
66% of small businesses to oppose a change to first-to-file priority). See also 138 Congo Rec.
H7370-72 (daily ed. Aug. 4, 1992) (statement of Rep. Bentley).
10 E.g., Statement of the Association of University Technology Managers, Joint Hearings on
S. 2605 and H.R. 4978 Before the Senate Subcommittee on Patents, Copyrights and Trademarks
and the House Subcommittee on Intellectual Property and Judicial Administration of the House
and Senate Committees on the Judiciary, 102d Cong., 2d Sess. (April 30, 1992) (delivered by
Howard Bremer) (hereinafter "Statement of the AUTM").
11 See, e.g., supra, n.8; Statement of Banner on Resolution 102-1 at the Annual Meeting of
the ABA-PTe (August 10, 1991), reprinted in ABA-PTe, 1990-91 Annual Report, at 63-64.
Commissioner Banner's concerns center on whether those who will be affected by harmonization
have been kept adequately informed.
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means unified in its support of harmonization,12 and even the remarks
of key members of Congress evidence ambivalence. 13
In support of their positions, critics of harmonization have tended
to debate the merits of the individual proposals that appear likely to
be part of the final Patent Harmonization Treaty. Some have criticized, for example, the proposal to replace the current first-to-invent
system of priority in the United States with one based on a first-tofile rationale. 14 Others have argued against the introduction of prioruser rights into the United States. 15
This essay also raises questions about the Patent Harmonization
Treaty. Rather than focusing on the substance of individual provisions, however, it addresses the overall direction of harmonization in
this country and the processes that are being applied to the harmonization effort. Section I of the essay compares the underlying goals
of patent harmonization with those of the current United States patent
system. The article contends that the legal rules relating to patents in
this country evidence a specific intent to promote domestic industry.
The aims of harmonization, in contrast, are fundamentally different.
To be valid, then, patent harmonization may require a basic shift in
the social consensus in this country concerning the use of patents.
Section II examines the lawmaking processes that WIPO has
used to arrive at the current text of the Patent Harmonization Treaty.
In particular, it compares the lawmaking processes of WIPO with
12 See, e.g., Remarks of Kirk, 1991 AIPLA Bull. 442 (observing that, as of January 1991,
"no organized support" beyond a "few individuals" was being shown in favor of adopting a
first-to-file priority system in the U.S.). The ABA-PTC adopted several resolutions generally
favoring harmonization at its 1992 Annual Meeting, but over strong opposition. The ABA-PTe
recommitted other resolutions that dealt with harmonization more specifically.
13 See, e.g., Statement of Senator DeConcini, Joint Hearings on S. 2605 and H.R. 4978 Before
the Senate Subcommittee on Patents, Copyrights and Trademarks and the House Subcommittee
on Intellectual Propeny and Judicial Administration of the House and Senate Committees on the
Judiciary, 102d Cong., 2d Sess. (April 30, 1992) ("Harmonization would lead to the most
significant changes in the United States Patent Law since the Patent Act of 1836. Thus, it is my
view that such drastic changes to fundamental aspects of our patent system should be examined
and considered in Congress and not in a backroom meeting in Brussels or Geneva. And let me
make this clear-in this senator's view, the burden is on those who seek to change our patent
system. They must prove their case that change is necessary. ").
14 E.g., Statement of the AUTM, supra, n.10; Keegan, Robert R., Re: Blake R. Wiggs Article
"Canada's First-to-File Experience, 73 JPTOS 804 (1991) (letter to the editor); Katona, Gabriel,
First-to-File-Not in the United States, 73 JPTOS 399 (1991); Macedo, Charles R.B., First to
File: Is American Adoption of the International Standard Worth the Price?, 1988 Colum. Bus.
L. Rev. 543 (1988).
15 E.g., Statement of Wyatt, supra, n.8; Statement of the AUTM, supra, n.lO. Cf. Brownlee,
L.M., Trade Secret Use of Patentable Inventions, Prior User Rights and Patent Law Harmonization: An Analysis and Proposal, 72 JPTOS 523 (1990) (suggesting changes to treaty provision).
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those that the American Law Institute (the" ALI") has used recently
to restate the law of trademarks. The ALI's mechanisms have been
careful and inclusive. The essay concludes, however, that when viewed
from the perspective of the national interests of the United States,
WIPO's mechanisms have not. It is likely, therefore, that the terms
of the Patent Harmonization Treaty do not reflect the full expertise
of the legal community of the United States. It is also possible that
the substance of the Patent Harmonization Treaty has in fact wandered
away from the social consensus that exists in the United States for
it.
Section III addresses the general feasibility of using legislative
lawmaking methods to define the law of patents in this country. Even
if the processes of WIPO are unacceptable, it does not necessarily
follow that the United States cannot attain patent harmonization via
some other lawmaking method. We have legislated statutory schemes
to govern other complex areas of law, and it is therefore at least
theoretically possible that we could make patent law succumb to
similar efforts. Section III of the article, however, argues that proper
efforts to legislate harmonization are likely to be difficult and time
consuming. The great majority of the current law of patents in the
United States is the result of significant common law development.
Recent legislation relating to patents has shown that legislated rules
of patent law often have unintended effects. The current harmonization effort, moreover, is much more comprehensive than any patent
legislation we have attempted to date. As a result, there are substantial
reasons to decline the opportunity to design a harmonized set of patent
laws through legislation.
I. HARMONIZATION VS. PROTECfIONISM

The broad goal of patent harmonization is to produce a set of
patent laws in various countries that are substantially uniform, to
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thereby facilitate the trans-national assertion of patent rights. 16 Harmonization thus reflects the implicit decision to approach competitive
inventive activity in a manner that disregards the national origin of
the inventorY It is assumed that such a free-trade, "level playing
field" condition will optimize the pace of technological development
worldwide, or at least operate to the net benefit of U.S. inventive
entities. 18
Comparing these goals and assumptions of harmonization to the
present U.S. patent system creates fundamental difficulties. Patent
systems, including the patent system of the United States, are mech16 See, e.g., WIPO Convention, Art. 3, 4 (1967), Leaffer, at 567:
Article 3
Objectives of the Organization

The objectives of the Organization are:
(i) to promote the protection of intellectual property throughout the world through cooperation among States.•..
Article 4
Functions

In order to attain the objectives described in Article 3, the Organization, through its appropriate organs, and
subject to the competence of each of the Unions:
(i) shall promote the development of measures designed to facilitate the efficient protection of intellectual
property throughout the world and to harmonize national legislation in this field[.]

See also WIPO, Report on the Work of Main Committee V (World Intellectual Property Organization), in Reports on the Work of the Five Main Committees of the Intellectual Property
Conference of Stockholm, 1967, WIPO Doc. No. 309(E), at 123, 128-29 (1967) (hereinafter
"Report on the Work of Main Committee V"). See generally, e.g., 1 Ladas, at 13 (observing
that "unification and harmonization of the law of industrial property on a worldwide basis" is
hoped to "lead to automatic world recognition of rights of industrial property"); Penrose, at ch.
3 (discussing history of the Paris Convention); Ulmer, E., Copyright and Industrial Property, 14
International Encyclopedia of Comparative Law, ch. 1, 10 (1987) (hereinafter "Ulmer").
17 Article 2 of the Paris Convention, for example, requires that each member country provide
nationals of any member country with the same rights that the country gives to its own nationals.
See generally Leaffer, at 7-8; 1 Ladas, at 283. The Patent Harmonization Treaty can be viewed
as an effort to carry this general rationale into further specifics, as well as to require more rigorous
minimum standards of protection than the Paris Convention currently provides for.
18 See Simon, E., U.S. Trade Policy and Intellectual Property Rights, 50 Albany L.J. 501
(1986) (hereinafter "Simon"); Remarks of Emory Simon at the Symposium on Trade-Related
Aspects of Intellectual Property, March 24-25, 1989, reprinted in 22 Vand. J. Transnat'l. L. 367
(1989). Simon refers to a "white paper" issued by the Administration in 1985 that reportedly
detailed the Administration's objectives with regard to international negotiations on intellectual
property. 50 Albany L.J. at 502-03, 506-07. The Office of the United States Trade Representative,
however, has been unable to locate copies of the document in response to inquiries from the
author's staff.
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an isms to increase wealth. 19 They encourage the disclosure of new
technology,20 thereby fostering the creation of wealth in the form of
publicly available information. They also spur increased inventive
activity, thereby increasing wealth in the form of industrial knowhow even apart from the disclosure function. 21
Viewed more specifically, the U.S. patent system is focused
narrowly on increasing the national wealth of the United States. 22
The United States patent system does not ask whether inventions are
new worldwide. Instead, it limits anticipating prior knowledge, use
19 E.g., Heald, Paul, Federal Intellectual Propeny and the Economics of Preemption, 76 Iowa
L.J. 959, 962 (1991). See, e.g., Abramson, The Patent System: Its Economic and Social Basis,
Patent Study No. 26 of the Subcomm. on Patents, Trademarks and Copyright of the Committee
on the Judicial)' of the United States Sen., 86th Cong., 2d Sess., 6 (1958) (reports in this set are
hereinafter referred to individually as "Patent Study No. ") ("[I]t will be in society's interest
to assure, at a minimum, the supply of any invention whose costs of creation can be recovered
through savings made possible in manufacture, or through the profitable sale of a new product.").
At one time, patent systems were also justified as a means of recognizing the inventor's property
interest, or "natural right," in his or her invention. That rationale, however, was largely discarded
in the nineteenth centul)'. See Ma1chup & Penrose, The Patent Controversy in the Nineteenth
Century, 10 J. Econ. Hist. 1 (1950) (hereinafter "Ma1chup & Penrose").
20 E.g., Patent Study No. 26 at 5; Vaughan, F.L., The United States Patent System, 27·29
(1977) (hereinafter "Vaughan"); Penrose, at 31·34; Ma1chup, F., An Economic Review of the
Patent System, Patent Study No. 15, 21·24 (1958).
21 E.g., Patent Study No. 26, at 5; Vaughan, at 29·32; Vernon, The International Patent
System and Foreign Policy, Patent Study No.5, 6 (1957) ("The underlying economic assumption
in the grant of patent monopolies by the government to their own nationals is that the monopoly
is essential to the stimulation of invention or investment; and that the stimulation afforded by the
grant contributes more to the well.being of the nation than the inherent cost of the monopoly. ");
Patent Study No. 15, at 59·62 (asserting that role of patent system is to encourage creation of
inventions whose value exceeds their social cost); Kaufer, E. The Economics of the Patent System,
19 (1989) (hereinafter "Kaufer"); Penrose, at 34·4l.
22 Cf. Patent Study No.5, at 6 ("The institution of the patent grant was originally de·
vised ... partly as a device for stimulating domestic industry. "); Patent Study No. 15, at 17;
Penrose, at 88·89; and the sources cited infra, nn.23·43. The same function has been asserted to
be a basis of trade secret law. Fetterley, D., Historical Perspectives on Criminal Laws Relating
to the Theft of Trade Secrets, Bus. Lawyer 1535 (1970).
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or sale to acts that have occurred "in this country."23 This is because
introducing new information into the United States increases the national wealth of this country, even though the information may already be known elsewhere. United States patent law therefore rewards
conduct of this latter type, despite the fact that the U.S. patentee,
strictly speaking, is not the first inventor of the patented advance. 24
This focus on information available within the United States
leads to another important, corollary aspect of the United States patent
system. Logically, if enriching the United States is the meaningful
act that the patent system seeks to encourage, then the inventor who
first brings the patentable advance to the United States should have
the superior claim in a priority contest. Consistent with this aim, the
23 Sections 102(a) and (b) of Title 35, U.S.C. provide:
§ 102. Conditions for patentability; novelty and loss of right to patent. A person shall be entitled to a patent

unless(a) the invention was known or used in this country . .. before the invention thereof by the applicant.
(b) the invention was •.. in public use or on sale in this country . .. more than one year before the date of
application for patent in the United States[.]

(emphasis added). In this respect the patent law of the United States differs notably from the
patent laws of numerous other countries, which disregard the geographic location of public uses
and sales for the purpose of determining novelty. See generally President's Commission on the
Patent System, "To Promote the Progress of. . . the Useful Arts" in an Age of Exploding Technology, (1966).
The fact that publications outside the United States also qualify as anticipating disclosures can
be explained via assumptions about the larger availability of such information to United States
nationals, rather than any focus on the worldwide nature of the advance sought to be patented.
See, e.g., Gayler v. Wilder, 51 U.S. 477, 497 (1850) ("If the foreign invention had been printed
or published, it was already given to the world and open to the people of this country, as well
of by others, upon reasonable inquiry. . . . But if the foreign discovery is not patented, nor
described in any printed publication, it might be known and used in remote places for ages, and
the people of this country be unable to profit by it.") See generally 1 Chisum, Patents, § 3.05[5]
(1992).
24 The assertion is an inherent result of disregarding foreign knowledge and use for purposes
of determining novelty and nonobviousness. See, e.g., sections 102(a), (b). Current discussions
of the territorial restrictions in these sections tend to focus on the practical problems that arise
when trying to prove activities outside the United States. It appears clear, however, that at the
time the United States adopted the restrictions this concern was subservient to the motivation
discussed in the main text.
As a closely related example, it was possible until the British Patent Act of 1977 to patent an
invention in the United Kingdom on its first introduction into that country from abroad, even
though the "introducer" derived the invention from another. See Chartered Institute of Patent
Agents, C.I.P .A. Guide to the Patents Acts, §7.07 (1990); Armitage, Edward, Patents: Recent
Developments and Future Prospects on the National Level in the United Kingdom, in Current
Trends in the Field of Intellectual Property, 103, 107 (1971); Patent Study No. 15, at 7 n.33.
Evidence indicates that the practice was of ancient lineage, see Bugbee, B.W., The Genesis of
American Patent and Copyright Law (1967) (hereinafter "Bugbee"), and that many countries
once granted such "patents of importation."
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United States patent law prohibits inventors from proving dates of
invention on the basis of activities that have been performed outside
the United States. 25 Far from being historical anachronisms, the territorial restrictions in Chapter 10 of the patent code26 are outgrowths
of a fundamental purpose of the United States patent system. 27
In addition, patent systems promote national wealth in another
way that has more direct implications for patent harmonization. Patents stimulate inventive activity by promising to transfer more wealth
from consumers of the patented advance to the patent owner than
25 Section 102(g) provides:
§ 102. Conditions for patentability; novelty and loss of right to patent. A person shall be entitled to a patent
unless(g) before the applicant's invention thereof the invention was made in this country by another .•••

(emphasis added).
Section 104 provides:
§ 104. Inventions made abroad
In proceedings in the Patent and Trademark Office and in the courts, an applicant for a patent, or a patentee,
may not establish a date of invention by reference to knowledge or use thereof, or other activity with respect
thereto, in a foreign country, except as provided in sections 119 and 365 of this title [implementing the Paris
Convention and Patent Cooperation Treaties].

(emphasis added). Section 102(a) can be regarded as a first-to-invent section whose territorial
restrictions are consistent with the point made here in the text_
It can be argued that symmetry concerns and the focus in Sections 102(a) and 102(b) on acts
"in this country" compel the territorial restrictions in sections 102(g) and 104. While the proof
is somewhat too involved to present here in full detail, interested readers can find the matter
discussed in some detail in Electric Storage Battery Co. v. Shimadzu, 307 U_S. 5 (1939); Chambers v. Duncan, 1876 C.D. 82 (Comm'r_ Pat.); and 3 Chisum. Patents x 10.03[3].
It should be noted that the current proposal of the United States. which involves retaining a
first-to-invent system of priority, see supra, n.4. offers instead to remove the territorial restrictions
in section 104 and change the Hilmer rule. discussed infra, at nn.27. 39. See WI PO Doc. No.
PLT/DC/6 (proposal by United States); Remarks of Kirk. 1991 AIPLA Bull. 442 (discussing
substance of proposal).
26 Chapter 10 of Title 35. U.S.C .• consists of sections 100-105_
27 There are, of course. various provisions in the patent laws of the United States that allow
foreign inventors to rely on the filing of certain non-U.S. patent applications for priority. E.g.,
35 U.S.C_ §§ 102(e). 104. 119. The provisions were added to implement the Paris Convention
and the Patent Cooperation Treaty. They are. however, essentially layered over the basic structure
of the U .S_ patent system and have not forced the United States to change the national focus of
its patent laws. See generally 4 Chisum. Patents. § 14.02[3]. (The rule embodied in section 104
of the patent code, for example, was created after the United States implemented the Paris
Convention. See Electric Storage Battery Co. v. Shimadzu, 307 U.S. 5 (1939); and Section 9 of
the Patent Act of August 8, 1946, Ch. 910, Pub. L. No. 690, 79th Cong., 2d Sess., 90 Stat.
640 (enacting predecessor of section 104).) The fact that these foreign-priority provisions proceed
from a different theoretical basis may explain why they coexist with the rest of United States
patent law uncomfortably. See, e.g., In re Hilmer, 359 F.2d 859 (CCPA 1966) and In re Hilmer,
424 F.2d 1108 (CCPA 1970) (holding that foreign priority date has no effect for prior art purposes); 1 Ladas, at 304-06 (asserting that holdings of the Hilmer decisions "conflict" with Article
4 of the Paris Convention).
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would be the case in an open market. 28 Thus, when the patent owner
is a foreign entity, the patent increases the outflow of wealth from
the patenting country. 29 When the patent owner is a domestic entity,conversely, the increased market power that the patent confers
over foreign competitors may stem an outflow of wealth that would
28 E.g., Patent Study No. 26, at 7 ("[P]atentees ... enjoy a degree of monopoly power.
. . . Production by any monopolist is likely to be at a lower level, and his prices higher, than
would prevail if the industry were competitive."); Patent Study No. 15, at 44 (asserting that
patent owners ultimate collect their quasi-rents from consumers as part of the price paid for goods
and services). See, e.g., Posner, R., Economic Analysis of law, 195-99 (2d ed. 1977) (asserting
that single producer, such as a patent holder, will maximize profits at a selling price that is higher
than would exist in competitive market); Kitch, E.W., The Nature and Function of the Patent
System, 20 J.L. & Econ. 265. 266-67 (1977) ("Offsetting [the incentive] benefit of the patent
system is the fact that the patent subjects new technology to exclusive control and, assuming that
the demand curve for the technology has a negative slope, adversely affects social welfare, ceteris
paribus. ").
29 Patent Study No. 15, at 55 (asserting that foreign holdings of domestic patents act as
"deductions from national wealth"); Penrose, at 95·96. See, e.g., Vaughan, at 259-60 ("Our
laws allow foreigners to take out patents in this country merely for the purpose of reserving the
United States as a market for their patented products; the result in some instances is the prevention
of manufacture in this country in spite of more favorable factors of production here than abroad.
The only benefit arising here comes mainly from the importation of such inventions or the products
they make possible .... "). Cf Patent Study No.5, at 4 (observing that providing rights to
foreign patentees raises concern of undue control of domestic economy, and asserting that the
United States was previously able to ignore such concerns due to the low percentage of foreign
nationals who held U.S. patents at the time).
Some commentators have considered patents to be analogous to tariffs as barriers to trade.
E.g., Simon, 50 Albany L.J. 501. The implication is apparently that the same economic calculations that support the decision to seek low tariffs should also support the decision to favor open
transnational patenting. Others, however, have described the analogy between tariffs and patents
as "not entirely apt." Patent Study No. 26 at 13. For example, reducing tariffs has the positive
effect of lowering costs of the affected goods to domestic consumers, which tends to offset the
harm that the lower tariff inflicts on the inefficient domestic producers who the tariff previously
protected. In comparison, allowing foreigners increased access to domestic patents does not benefit
domestic consumers significantly-foreign patenting merely places single-source control of the
patented good into the hands of a supplier that is foreign. Absent the increased access, the good
would be either unpatented or controlled by a domestic patent holder. It appears likely, then, that
a separate set of economic calculations would be required to support the decision to favor open
transnational patenting.
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otherwise occur. Under this rationale there are substantial reasons to
favor nationals over foreigners in the patenting process. 30
Comparing first-to-invent priority with priority based on firstto-file demonstrates how these concerns exist in the patent system of
the United States today. Supporters of harmonization have advocated
first-to-file priority over the present rationale of first-to-invent 31 because of alleged administrative efficiencies. 32 They have also argued
that first-to-file priority will reward more directly the attempt to disclose the patented advance, thus arguably increasing the efficiency
with which the patent system will increase wealth. 33
30 See, e.g., Penrose, at 112-127 ("[P]urely from the standpoint of its own economic benefit,
a single country could conclude that it had nothing to gain and much to lose by including foreign
inventions within the protection of its patent law, providing that the direct gain from granting
foreign patents was the only consideration. "); Patent Study No.5, at 6 (" [I]t does not follow
[from the general economic assumptions that favor patents] that the extension of patent rights by
nations to foreigners has the same general effect upon inventiveness or the disclosure of inventions
as those granted to nationals; .. .it is easy to envisage cases in which the issuance of a foreign
patent may have no effect on inventiveness or public information regarding inventions. "); Patent
Study No. 15, at 12.
The same analysis can lead to the conclusion that no patent system, or perhaps only a weak
patent system, is preferable where conditions suggest that foreigners will hold significant portions
of a country's patents. Switzerland denied patent protection to chemical processes during the 19th
century, for example, when it appeared that the owners of Swiss patents on such subject matter
would be German, rather than Swiss corporations. E.g., Kaufer, at 10; Penrose, at 16-17, 12024. China announced its adherence to the same general strategy in the 1980's. Kaufer, at 48.
This may explain the general hostility of developing countries to the protection of intellectual
property. See, e.g., 1 Ladas, at 13; Penrose, at 115-17; Braga, C., The Economics of Intellectual
Property Rights and the GATT: A View from the South, 22 Vand. J. Transnat'l. L. 243 (1989);
Berkowitz and Kotowitz, Patent Policy in an Open Economy, 15 Can. J. Econ. 1 (1982). For
discussions of specific examples of such arguable hostility, see, e.g., Fiorito, E.G., 73 JPTOS
83, 89-91 (1991) (discussing proposal by developing countries to allow limits on fields of technology that are patentable); Kaufer, at 13, 51 (discussing attempt by developing countries in early
1980's to allow the grant of exclusive compulsory licenses); See generally, e.g., Patent Study
No.5, at 12-13 (discussing economic rationale); Kaufer, at 47-48 (same); Greer, D., The Case
Against the Patent System in Less Developed Countries, 8 Int'\. J. of L. & Econ. 223 (1973)
(hereinafter "Greer"); Note, The Role of the Patent System in technology Transfer: The Japanese
Experience, 26 Colum. 1. Transnat'\' L. (1987).
The analysis in the text, of course, is not complete. The promise of an increased pace of
technological advance generally, or the threat of retaliatory trade practices by countries whose
inventors are disadvantaged, may make a strong patent system worthwhile even at the cost of
enriching foreign patent holders.
31 The United States law of first-to-invent is embodied essentially in sections 102(a), 102(e)
and 102(g).
32 E.g., Wiggs, Blake Rd., Canada's First·to-File Experience-Should the U.S. Make the
Move?, 73 JPTOS 493, 502-03 (1991) (hereinafter "Wiggs"); Wrenn, Gregory J., What Should
be Our Priority-Protection for the First to File or the First to Invent?, 72 JPTOS 872, 878-80
(1990) (hereinafter "Wrenn"); Dunner, Donald R., First to File: Should Our Interference System
be Abolished?, 68 JPTOS 561, 562-63 (1986). These sources are representative of a much larger
literature.
33 E.g., Wiggs, 73 JPTOS at 507-09; Wrenn, 72 JPTOS at 883-85.
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The difficulty with these assertions is that they analyze the effect
of the two competing priority rationales on situations where the patent
applicants are domestic entities. They igriore, therefore, the differences in the transnational effects of the two rationales-effects that
are significant and perhaps even dominant. 34 Specifically, awarding
priority under the United States' current first-ta-invent rationale, when
coupled with the provisions that restrict proof of invention to the
United States,35 effectively advantages domestic inventors over foreign nationals in the contest to obtain United States patents. 36 Awarding priority under a first-to-file rationale does not, in contrast,
particularly if one allows foreign applicants to establish priority by
filing national applications in their own countries. 37 The advantage
that United States inventors currently enjoy under first-to-invent,
moreover, is extremely one-sided, in that foreign patent systems already determine priority on the basis of filing date,38 a contest in
which United States inventors can compete evenly.39
The effect of United States patent law to disadvantage foreign
inventors, in fact, is even more clear when viewed historically. The
United States for a time required that foreign patentees work their
34 Wiggs, for example, does not treat the transnational effects of the two competing priority
rationales, despite identifying no less than twenty seven arguments that favor a first-to-invent
system.
35 See supra, n.25.
36 See, e.g., International Federation of Industrial Property Counsel, FlCPI Position Paper
for the Diplomatic Conference for the Conclusion of a Treaty Supplementing the Paris Convention
as Far as Patents Are Concerned (Patent Law Hannonization Treaty), at 1-2 (May 6, 1991)
(hereinafter "FICPI Position Paper") (discussing result as "geographical imbalance" in favor
of domestic inventors).
37 Article 4 of the Paris Convention requires that foreign inventors be allowed to establish
priority on the basis of foreign filings that meet certain specified criteria. Leaffer, at 21-23.
38 Article 60(2) of the European Patent Convention (hereinafter the "EPC"), reprinted in
Leaffer, at 144, 166, for example, awards patent rights to the inventor whose "application has
the earliest date of filing." Article 87 of the EPC accords a foreign-filed application with priority
under the Paris Convention. Leaffer, at 175-76.
39 Not coincidentally, a shift in the priority rules of the United States from a first-to-invent to
a first-to-file rationale has been a major objective of foreign interests in the WIPO meetings. See,
e.g., Report of the Third Meeting of the Advisory Commission on Patent Law Reform, at 17-18
(on file with the PTO) (reporting evaluation by the PTO that "without this concession [on U.S.
priority) the U.S. will have very little leverage" in the WIPO negotiations). Certain foreign
delegations are willing to accept the United States' alternate proposal to retain first-to-invent
priority but permit priority based on foreign activities, as discussed supra, n.25, see FlCPI
Position Paper, at 1-2; Remarks of Bardehle at the Spring-Stated Meeting of the AIPLA (May
2,1991), 1991 AIPLA Bull. 633, 636 (July-Sept.), apparently because either change will seriously
weaken the bias of the current United States patent system toward domestic inventors.
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patented inventions in the United States as a condition of protection. 4O
No such requirement applied to domestic patentees. 41 For a time the
United States even denied foreign inventors the right to obtain United
States patents altogether. 42
With this background, the conflict between harmonization and
the present United States patent system is clear. The United States
patent system has never been a means of fostering free trade-rather,
it is a set of measures whose effects are substantially protectionist. 43
The globalist aims of patent harmonization may therefore be inconsistent with the underlying assumptions upon which the current United
States patent system is based.
The point of this observation is not that economic decisions made
in the 19th century should bind the United States immutably today,
or even that harmonization is wrong on its merits. Instead, the lesson
is a narrower one: the simple existence of the present United States
patent system does not imply a mandate to harmonize. Stated another
way, perfecting the present United States patent system may mean
making it more effectively protectionist, not less so as is the goal of
harmonization.
This lesson is enormously important in terms of legal process.
The law should change only in response to the formation of an appropriate social consensus. In the case of patent harmonization this
means first resolving to adopt a globalist, free-trade approach to in40 Section 15 of the Patent Act of 1836, Ch. 357, 5 Stat. 117, made it a defense to an action
for patent infringement if
Ihe palenlee, if an alien at the dme the patent was granted, had failed and neglecled for the space of eighleen
months from Ihe dale of Ihe palenl, 10 pUI and conlinue on sale 10 Ihe public, on reasonable lerms, Ihe invenlion
or discovery for which Ihe palenl issued.

(emphasis added). The provision remained in force until 1870. See generally 2 Robinson,
Patents for Inventions, § 632 (1890). Vernon discusses the general history of working requirements
in Patent Study No.5, at 3, 7, and asserts that the function of such requirements is to favor the
stimulation of domestic industry in the face of patenting by foreigners. Accord, Penrose, at 7887, 137-61; Patent Study No. 15, at 17 n.92.
41 Section 15 of the Patent Act of 1836.
42 Section 1 of the Patent Act of 1793, Ch. 11, 1 Stat. 318, permitted U.S. patents to be
issued only to .. a citizen or citizens of the United States." This provision was replaced by Section
1 of the Patent Act of 1800, which allowed aliens to take out U.S. patents provided that they had
been resident in the United States for the previous two years. See generally Philips, The Law of
Patents for Inventions, Ch. VI, § 7 (1837). The Patent Act of July 13, 1832 expanded this to any
alien who declared an intention to become a citizen of the United States. This last provision
remained in force until superceded by Section 15 of the Act of 1836, as discussed in the two
immediately preceeding footnotes.
43 Indeed, patent systems worldwide have been viewed as protectionist mechanisms at odds
with free trade. E.g., Kaufer, at 8-10; Malchup & Penrose, 10 J. Econ; Hist. at 4-10. See infra,
n.137.
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novation and patenting, with all of its risks and potential advantages.
The United States has not been operating according to that consensus
to date; indeed, it is possible that we have been operating under an
opposite one. Large exporting corporations that are heavily invested
in research and development may prosper from a level international
playing field. 44 Whether the United States as a whole will be better
off, however, is at least a different question. 45
Perhaps, then, part of the unease over harmonization involves a
reluctance to make such fundamental and far-reaching changes in our
approach to protecting United States technology. If that is so, persuading the critics of harmonization will require us to confront much
more basic value judgments than we have been discussing up to now.
The United States is the largest consumer market in the world,46 and
we are net consumers, rather than producers, of goods and services. 47
Patent harmonization in the form currently under consideration may
simply not be in our national interest. 48
44 E.g., Penrose, at 126 ("The fact is that the immediate gain to exporting firms of all
industrialized countries is so evident that strong pressures would in any case come from them [if
no international patent system were present] in favor of a regime in which patents can be obtained
in foreign countries. ").
45 See, e.g., Patent Study No.5, at 12 ("A nation considering whether and on what terms to
grant patents to foreigners has some exceedingly complicated economic judgments to make. ");
1 Ladas, at 15 ("[H]armonization has to be viewed realistically. The trend toward viewing
'harmonization' as a good thing no matter what the problems are, as an end in itself, is subject
to a fair degree of qualification. In certain areas it may be simply undesirable or impractical from
a country's national point of view, since the concessions that would have to be made to achieve
agreement may not be worth it. ").
46 Current estimates rank the United States as consuming 30-35% of the world's goods and
services. The United States is thus the world's largest single consumer market, pending the
European Community'S adoption of structural changes in 1993.
47 E.g., Economic Report of the President, H.R. Doc. No. 177, 102d Cong., 2d Sess., 416
(1992) (reporting 1990 trade deficit of $123.4 billion). Penrose asserts that a country's gain from
the transnational flow of wealth due to foreign patenting "is especially important for the large
exporting countries, who export more patented products than they import; in general the gain is
obtained at the expense of the importing countries." Penrose, at 95. Vernon analyzes balance·
of·trade figures more specifically as to nonfood manufactured products, on the assumption that
patent protection will be limited largely to these categories of imports and exports. Patent Study
No.5, at 7-8.
48 See, e.g., Penrose, at 111 ("In balancing the costs and gains of extending patent protection
to non-resident foreigners without imposing special restrictions and obligations, most countries
have considered that the costs exceed the gains."); id. at 125 ("[Elven for [larger industrialized
countries] the balance of costs and gains [from an international regime sanctioning foreign patents]
does not clearly show a net gain. ").
In light of the discussion supra, nn.34-39, this may be particularly true with regard to the
decision whether to adopt first-to·file priority. See Penrose, at 114 ("It seems clear ... that if the
firms in a country could obtain patents abroad regardless of whether foreigners were granted
patents in their country, few countries would find it to their advantage to grant patents on foreign
inventions . . . . ").
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This focus on harmonization vs. protectionism can shed new
light on other provisions that are at issue in harmonization. For example, the grace-period provisions that the United States is seeking
to insert in the laws of foreign countries as a part of harmonization
would be applied without regard to national origin. 49 Foreign patent
systems that do not have a grace period, however, already apply the
concept of absolute novelty evenly to both national and foreign inventors. 50 The presence or absence of a grace period outside the
United States therefore has a largely neutral effect on the relative
national interests of the United States and other countriesY The gains
to the United States from inserting grace periods into the national
patent systems of foreign countries thus may not compensate ade49 Basic Proposal, Art. 12, WIPO Doc. No. PLTIDC/3, at 22-23 ("Disclosures Not Affecting
Patentability (Grace Period)"). See generally Pagenberg, 19 AIPLA Q.J. at 8-9.
50 The Strassbourg Convention and the EPC, for example, both consider an invention old if
it forms "part of the state of the art." Each defines the state of the art to comprise "everything
made available to the public," with no qualification as to location. Strassbourg Convention on
the Unification of Certain Points of Substantive Law on Patents for Inventions, Nov. 27, 1963,
art. 4, reprinted in Jacob, A.J., Patents Throughout the World, app. C5 (1992) (hereinafter
"Jacob"); European Patent Convention, Oct. 5, 1973, art. 54, reprinted in Leaffer, at 143, 164.
In effect then, United States inventors who seek patents in foreign countries currently have at
least one disadvantage in comparison to foreign inventors who seek United States patents. Such
United States inventors must confront their own public disclosures as prior art, regardless of the
geographic location of the disclosure. Foreign inventors seeking United States patents, in contrast,
need only confront their public uses and sales as anticipations if those event occurred in this
country. See supra, n.23. This same consideration offsets to some degree the advantage that
United States inventors enjoy domestically under section 104. See supra, n.25.
51 The international imposition of a facially neutral grace period provision may affect the
national interests of certain countries. The use of a grace period advantages those who originate
public disclosures of new technology, at the expense of those who receive such disclosures.
Particular countries in which the former activity predominates over the latter, i. e. , those countries
that tend to be "leaders" in new technology, arguably stand to benefit over countries that tend
to be followers. This mechanism may explain, for example, the disagreement between Germany
and other countries in Europe over the grace period provisions in the Patent Harmonization Treaty.
See generally Bardehle, 1991 Indus. Prop. at 372.
It would appear to be difficult to rely on this mechanism to guide the formation of policy,
however. For example, the effects of this mechanism depend on economic conditions that presumably will change in a given country over time, thus possibly causing what was a net benefit
to become a net cost. Originators of new technology may curtail their public disclosures if the
protection of a grace period is absent. In addition, the imposition of a grace period may affect
various segments within a given country unequally. Specifically, a grace period will naturally
favor those entities that possess leading technology. See infra, n.l06.
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quately for the proposed change in the United States to first-to-file
priority. 52
Prior-user rights provide another example. Current proposals have
the United Stated adopting prior-user rights only as part of a harmonization package. 53 Prior-user rights, however, shift economic returns away from the patent owner to the prior user. 54 They would
exist in favor of United States nationals primarily, inasmuch as they
are created only by domestic efforts to commercialize. 55 Current statistics show, at the same time, that a substantial percentage of United
States patentees are foreign entities. 56 Adopting prior-user rights in
the United States will therefore shift economic returns from a category
52 This analysis suggests that the eagerness of some countries for harmonization may not be
a source of comfort to the U.S. From a nationalistic viewpoint, the costs and benefits of harmonization may appear quite different to those outside the U.S. See, e.g., FICPI Position Paper,
at 1 (describing the elimination from United States patent law of "bias in favour of residents of
the U.S." as "[aln attractive result of universal acceptance" of the treaty); Penrose, at 117-18,
125 (arguing that availability of foreign patent protection is more important to smaller, rather
than larger industrialized countries due to the lack of a domestic market of sufficient size to yield
adequate profits).
53 E.g., Basic Proposal, art. 20, W1PO Doc. No. PLT/DC/3, at 41 ("Prior User"); s. 2605,
§ 3(b) (adding new section 273, entitled "Rights based on prior use," to Title 35, U.S.C.). Both
these documents also contain provisions that would install a first-to-file rationale of priority.
54 In general, the term "prior user" refers to one who has begun to utilize a technological
advance prior to some significant event in the process of another person obtaining patent rights
over the advance. The potential prior user's status can be judged, for example, as of the date the
patent owner's application is filed, published, or issued. Some have argued that prior user rights
can be determined as of the patent owner's date of invention. Persons who qualify as prior users
generally obtain limited rights to continue using the patented advance during the term of the
patent, regardless of whether the patent owner consents. See generally 1988 Group Reports of
the Association Intemationale Pour la Protection de la Propriete Industrielle [AIPPI1, no. V
(question 89D-prior use).
55 The Patent Harmonization Treaty calls for prior-users rights based upon use "within the
territory where the patent produces its effect." Basic Proposal, art. 20(1), WIPO Doc. No. PLT/
DC/3, at 41. The pending legislation before Congress would grant prior-user rights only to those
whose use was "in the United States." E.g., S. 2605, § 3(b) (proposing new 35 U.S.C. §
273(a». This national focus corresponds to nearly identical provisions in the national laws of
other countries. E.g., German Patent Act of December 16, 1980, § 12(1), translation reprinted
in Beier, F.K., German Industrial Property, Copyright, and Antitrust Laws, 6 IIC Studies 14, 17
(1983).
56 USPTO, Patents Issued by the Patent and Trademark Office, U.S. Dept. of Commerce
News Release No. 92-1 (Feb. 14, 1992) (reporting that residents of foreign countries obtained
45% of the United States patents issued in 1991). See also Kaufer, at 16 (discussing steep rise
in foreign ownership of U.S. patents over time). In Japan, in contrast, the percentage of patents
owned by foreign nationals actually decreased by nearly half from 1967 to 1980. Kaufer, at 17.
Recent evidence suggests that trend toward increasing foreign patenting in the United States may
have reversed. Buderi, R., Global Innovation: Who's in the Lead, Business Week, August 3,
1992, at 68.
For discussions of the effect of increasing domestic patenting by foreigners on domestic patent
policy decisions, see generally, e.g., Patent Study No.5, at 4; Greer, 8 J. of Int'1. L. & Econ.,
at 228-30.
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of persons with a substantial foreign character to one with an almost
entirely United States character. Perfecting the present United States
patent system according the present consensus might therefore involve adopting prior-user rights independent of any change in the
basis of priority.
II. THE WIPO

NEGOTIATIONS

Until the recent introduction of legislation before Conress,s7.the
United States has addressed harmonization largely through multilateral negotiations before WIPO.58 Those negotiations have been wide
ranging and comprehensive. 59 At the same time, limited numbers of
persons have participated in them on behalf of the U.S. 60
In reality, then, the WIPO negotiations have combined some of
the worst features of both the common-law and legislative systems
of lawmaking. The harmonization effort is addressing essentially the
whole law of patents simultaneously, divorced from any particular
factual setting. It therefore carries with it few of the guarantees of
quality that stem from the incremental, gradual lawmaking that is
characteristic of case-law development. 61 At the same time, this cost
has not been associated with an important, offsetting benefit of legislative efforts: representative participation in and control over the
lawmaking effort. 62 Thus, there are substantial reasons to view the
harmonization lawmaking efforts within WIPO skeptically.
Comparing the patent harmonization effort with the recent effort
of the American Law Institute to restate the American law of unfair
57 See supra, n.6.
58 International standards for the protection of intellectual property have also been discussed
in both the Tokyo and Uruguay Rounds of the GAlT negotiations. See generally, e.g., Richards,
John, Trade Related Intellectual Property Issues (TRIPS), 72 JPTOS 906 (1990) (hereinafter
"Richards"); Stamm, O.A., GATT Negotiations for the Protection of New Technologies, 73
JPTOS 680 (1991); Symposium, Trade Related Aspects of Intellectual Property, pts. 1 & 2, 22
Vand. J. Transnat'l. L. 223, 689 (1989); Beier, F.K. and Schricker, G., Gatt or WIPO? New
Ways in the International Protection of Intellectual Property, 11 IIC Studies (1991). The GAlT
negotiations are currently at an impasse.
59 The treaty addresses, for example, such substantive matters as the criteria for validity and
infringement, as well as remedies. In addition, it also addresses such questions as examination
procedures and unity of invention.
60 See the text infra, at nn.86-105.
61 See, e.g., Llewellyn, Karl N., The Case Law System in America, 14-16 (1989) (translation
of German-language edition of 1933); Cardozo, Benjamin, The Nature of the Judicial Process,
29-31 (1921).
62 See, e.g., Pound, R., Common Law and Legislation, 21 Harv. L. Rev. 383,403-07 (1908);
Cappelletii, Mauro, The Judicial Process in Comparative Perspective, 40-46 (1989) (discussing
criticism that common law is "undemocratic").
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competition illustrates these points. The ALI is a private, nonprofit
organization that exists for the purpose of "promot[ing] the clarification and simplification of the law. "63 As part of its work, it has
written and published the various volumes of the First and Second
Restatements of the Law. It is currently preparing the Third Restatement of the Law, which includes for the first time a separate work
on the law of unfair competition, including trademarks (hereinafter
the "Restatement of Unfair Competition").64
The WIPO negotiations are different from the ALI's restatement
efforts in at least two fundamental ways. First, the Restatement of
Unfair Competition is a far more modest exercise in lawmaking than
is the Patent Harmonization Treaty. The ALI's Restatements articulate existing law. Typically, they either describe settled law or choose
between alternative legal rules where there is a split of authority. 65
The Restatements therefore map a landscape of legal rules whose
contours are already largely understood. The WI PO negotiations, in
contrast, are designing a new law of patents. The WIPO negotiations,
in contrast, are designing a new law of patents. The United States
has never operated under many of the legal rules that the Patent
Harmonization Treaty prescribes. We are therefore not selecting be63 Certificate of Incorporation of the American Law Institute, Dist. Colum. Feb. 23, 1923,
reprinted in, e.g., 1992 ALI Annual Report 61. For discussions of the American Law Institute
generally, see, e.g., N.E.H. Hull, Restatement and Reform: A New Perspective on the Origins
of the American Law Institute, 8 L. & Hist. Rev. 56 (1990) and the sources cited therein.
64 To date, the ALI has produced three Tentative Drafts of the Restatement of Unfair Competition. Tentative Draft No.1, (April 12, 1988), Tentative Draft No.2, (March 23, 1990),
Tentative Draft No.3, (March 22, 1991). The full membership of the ALI is expected to consider
the fourth and final Tentative Draft at the ALI's annual meeting in 1993.
For general discussion of the Restatement of Unfair Competition, see Perlman, Harvey S., The
Restatement of the Law of Unfair Competition: A Work in Progress, 80 ~rademark Rep. 461
(1990) (hereinafter "Perlman"); and Edelman, Sandra, Restatement of the Law of Trademarks:
A Review, 81 Trademark Rep. 554 (1991) (hereinafter "Edelman").
65 See, e.g., Perlman, 80 Trademark Rep. at 463 ("The selection of those cases to restate and
the synthesis of disparate decisions gives some leeway at the margin to influence rather than to
merely report the state of the law. Although the Reporters have considerable discretion in formulating drafts, the process functions, nonetheless, to keep the Restatements close to, but not
always within, the mainstream of judicial decisions. ").
Examples of such choices include the ALI's decision not to adopt the "New York Rule" with
regard to the need to prove secondary meaning, see Restatement of Unfair Competition, § 13
(Tentative Draft No.2), and the decision to include fair use as a separate defense to infringement.
See id. at § 28 (Tentative Draft No.3). See generally, Edelman, 81 Trademark Rep. 554.
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tween alternatives whose consequences are known. 66 Instead, we are
speculating about the consequences of legal rules that we have yet to
apply.67
Second, the ALI is a private organization. 68 Its Restatements are
consequently works of private authorship.69 They have no official
status, even after the full membership of the ALI approves of them.
Thus, while an individual court may find a Restatement persuasive
on a given point, every court is free to reject all or a part of a
Restatement's assertions about the law.
The Patent Harmonization Treaty, in contrast, is being designed
to have an official status. Once the treaty is signed and ratified, the
United States will be required to enact legislation that will change its
66 It is true that many of the legal rules in the current text of the Patent Harmonization Treaty
that would be new to the United States nevertheless find precedent individually in the patent
systems of various foreign countries. The treaty, however, sets forth a "hybrid" patent system
comprised of rules borrowed from various national patent systems. It is almost certainly true,
therefore, that the assemblage of legal rules set forth in the treaty has never before governed the
patent system of any single country. As a result, the manner, if any, in which the rules interrelate
is largely unexplored.
More fundamentally, the use of foreign patent-law precedents as a basis for lawmaking in this
country necessarily raises all the uncertainties of the sociological and psychological components
of law have been discussed widely in connection with comparative law generally. See, e.g.,
Zweigert and Koetz, Introduction to Comparative Law, 8-12 (1987); Grossfeld, The Strength and
Weakness of Comparative Law, 71-74 (1990); Volkman-Schluck, Thomas, Continental European
Criminal Procedures: True or Illusory Model?, 9 Am. J. Crim. L. 1,3-6 (1981); Yntema, Hessel,
Comparative Law and Humanism, 7 Am. J. Comp. L. 493 (1958); Pound, Roscoe, Comparative
Law in Space and Time, 4 Am. J. Comp. L. 70 (1955). It would be almost necessarily false, for
example, to describe all the differences in inventive activity between countries as effects of the
countries' respective patent systems. Cf., e.g., Helfgott, S., Cultural Differences Between the
U.S. and Japanese Patent Systems, 72 JPTOS 231 (1990); Rines, R., Some Areas of Basic
Difference Between United States Patent Law and the Rest That of the Rest of the World-And
Why, 28 Idea, 5 (1987). Once this is admitted, identifying specific cause-and-effect relationships
in foreign patent systems and evaluating whether those relationships would apply to the United
States becomes extremely problematic.
67 See, e.g., Patent Study No.5, at 5 ("We plunge into this analysis [of the proper rules for
an international patent system] with one major misgiving. Policy toward the international patent
system turns heavily on an appraisal of its economic impact, and much of the data needed in
order to consider this impact objectively is lacking or inadequate. Although information exists
with respect to the system, its value is limited either because of its subjective and impressionistic
nature or because of the unrepresentative character of the situations that it covers. The generalizations of businessmen based upon their personal experiences; the isolated illustrations accidentally brought to light in one context or another; ... , though valuable, are too limited to test the
validity of broad generalizations. ").
68 See, e.g., the Certificate of Incorporation and Bylaws of the American Law Institute,
reprinted in, e.g., 1990 ALI Annual Report, 61, 63.
69 See generally, e.g., David, Rene, Major Legal Systems of the World Today, 404-06 (2d
ed. 1978).

HeinOnline -- 74 J. Pat. & Trademark Off. Soc’y 795 1992

796

R. Carl Moy

JPTOS

law of patents to conform to the treaty's provisions. 70 Even before
that time, once the treaty is finalized by WIPO its terms will be
inalterable-the choice will be either to ratify or to reject the treaty
as a whole. There will be no 'means of changing individual provisions
that are viewed as troublesome.
Both of these fundamental differences suggest that the United
States should be using even greater care to negotiate the Patent Harmonization Treaty than the ALI has used to p~epare its Restatement.
Because the task of patent harmonization involves creating new law,
it is by necessity much more uncertain and prone to error. At the
same time, the negative consequences of our failing to select the
proper rules are potentially much greater. We will not be allowed to
ignore any improvident selections of law. Instead, our guesswork
concerning an optimal patent system will be cast in the stone of a
binding multilateral agreement. Correcting our mistakes will not be
a matter of domestic legislation only. Rather, it will require us to
undertake the difficult and uncertain task of developing a consensus
in the international community. 71
Despite these suggestions, there are disturbing indications that
we have approached the WIPO negotiations with significantly less
care than the ALI gives a typical effort at restatement. The ALI
succinctly describes its procedure for arriving at a Restatement of the
Law on the inside front cover of each each of its Tentative Drafts:
Each portion of an Institute Project [including Restatement efforts] is submitted
initially for review to the Project's Consultants or Advisers as a Memorandum,
Preliminary Draft, or Advisory Group Draft. As revised, it is then submitted to
the council of the Institute in the form of a Council Draft. After review by the
Council, it is submitted as a Tentative Draft, Discussion Draft, or Proposed Official
Draft for consideration by the membership at the Institute's Annual Meeting. At

70 In general, under United States law treaties are either self.enforcing or require the passage
of enabling legislation to be given effect. The Paris Convention has been held to be not selfenforcing. Cameron Septic Tank Co. v. Knoxville, 227 U.S. 39 (1913). In its present form the
Patent Harmonization Treaty would appear to require the passage of enabling legislation.
71 See, e.g., David, Rene, The International Unification of Private Law, 2 International Encyclopedia of Comparative Law, ch. 5 at 120·22 ("Periodic revision [of international uniform·
law agreements] is likely to remain a matter of theory if it requires calling a special international
conference, as it is only with much difficulty and reluctance that the slow and costly machinery
of such conferences is put into motion, and there can be no question of using it to deal with minor
difficulties. "). The Paris Convention, for example, has been revised on only seven occasions
since its origination in 1883.
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Draft may be referred back for revision and

Under the ALI's procedures, then, four separate bodies review
each Restatement. The project is initially entrusted to a small number
of persons, known as Reporters, who conduct the original research. 73
The Reporters also write the initial version of the Restatement, which
is called a Preliminary Draft. 74 The Reporters then submit the Preliminary Draft simultaneously to two separate bodies: the Advisors
and the Members Consultative Group. The Advisors are individuals
"with substantial expertise and authority" in the particular field under
consideration who the ALI selects to assist the Reporters. 75 They are
often not members of the ALI. The Members Consultative Group
consists of members of the ALI who have indicated an interest in the
particular restatement project. 76 After receiving input from these two
groups, the Reporters prepare a Council Draft, which they submit to
the Council of the ALI. 77 If authorized by the Council, the Reporters
then prepare a Tentative Draft, which the general membership considers and votes upon at the ALI's annual meetings. 78 The project
does not become a true Restatement of the ALI until the general
membership votes its approval. 79

72 E.g., Tentative Draft No.1. Accord, Perlman, 80 Trademark Rep. at 462-463. The ALI's
Rules of the Council (hereinafter "Council Rules") describe aspects of the process at sections V
and VI. See, e.g., 1992 ALI Annual Report at 68, 73-74. The ALI's process of arriving at its
restatements is also discussed generally in Report of the Committee on the Establishment of a

Pennanent Organization for the Improvement of the Law Proposing the Establishment of an
American Law Institute, 1 ALI Proceedings, part I, at 48-56 (1923) (hereinafter "Report on the
Establishment of the ALl'').
73 E.g., Council Rule V. 1 ("Each project of the Institute shall be in charge of a reporter or
reporters employed by the Director [of the ALI] with the approval of the Council or the Executive
Committee. ").
74 Perlman, 80 Trademark Rep. at 462.
75Id.
76 See id.
77 See ALI Council Rule VI.1 ("Material intended for publication shall first be submitted to
the Council .... "); Perlman, 80 Trademark Rep. at 463.
The Council of the ALI functions approximately as the ALI's board of directors. See ALI
Bylaws, at 111.1, 1992 ALI Annual Report at 65. It is a group of about forty-two members elected
from the general membership. ALI Bylaws, at 111.2, 1992 ALI Annual Report at 65.
78 E.g., Perlman, 80 Trademark Rep. at 463. The ALI publishes transcripts of these debates
in its serial set, ALI Proceedings.
79 See, e.g., ALI Bylaws, V.1, 1992 ALI Annual Report at 66 ("No restatement ..• shall
be published as representing the position of the Institute unless authorized by the membership of
the Institute and approved by the Council. ").
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The process of arriving at the Patent Harmonization Treaty has
been quite different. 80 The International Bureau of WIPO prepared
the draft texts of the treaty and the accompanying regulations, as well
as the reports pertaining thereto. 81 In that sense, it has functioned
similarly to the Reporters of a Restatement. The International Bureau,
however, has presented those drafts for review to one body only the Committee of Experts.82 The process of arriving at the Patent
Harmonization Treaty has therefore lacked the sort of multi-tiered
review to which the ALI subjects its restatement efforts. One can
suspect, then, that the Patent Harmonization Treaty has not been
subjected to as rigorous or as varied a review as might have been the
case otherwise .
. The characteristics of the parties that have been involved in the
WIPO negotiations also give rise to concerns. For example, the ALI
typically appoints as Reporters United States lawyers, and the Restatements attempt to describe only the law that is appropriate for this
country. The International Bureau of WIPO, in contrast, is a continuation of the former United International Bureau for the Protection
of Industrial, Literary and Artistic Property, which was known under
its French acronym of BIRPI.83 While not necessarily hostile to United
States interests, it is not concerned per se with promoting the national
80 WlPO History, WIPO Doc. No. PLT/DC/5, presents a summary of the process of arriving
at the Patent Harmonization Treaty. For general descriptions of WIPO's processes for negotiating
the Patent Harmonization Treaty, see Fryer III, 72 JPTOS at 244-47; Remarks of Ludwig Baeumer
at the AIPLA Spring-Stated Meeting (May 2, 1991) 1991 AIPLA Bull. 630-33 (July-Sept.).
81 WlPO History, WIPO Doc. No. PLT/DC/5, at par. 15.
82 See generally id. Strictly speaking, the final meeting before WIPO was a diplomatic conference of the Paris Union, and not a meeting of the Committee of Experts. See supra, n.4. The
identity of the persons who participated on behalf of United States interests did not change
substantially, however, see infra, nn.86-103, and so the diplomatic conference cannot be considered a separate level of review.
83 See, e.g., Report on the Work of Main Committee V, at 126. For discussions of WIPO
generally, see, e.g., Ulmer, 14 International Encyclopedia of Comparative Law, ch. 1, at 10;
David, 2 International Encyclopedia of Comparative Law, ch. 5, at 173-74.
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interests of any country in particular. 84 It seems safe to assume that
the International Bureau did not draft the Patent Harmonization Treaty
with the goal of creating legal rules that would be optimal specifically
for the United States. 85 By default, then, the task of ensuring that the
terms of the treaty are appropriate for the United States has fallen on
a single group of persons - those persons who have attended the
WIPO meetings either as members of an official delegation of the
United States or a private organization with a primarily United-States
character. 86
There are disturbing implications that this group of U.S. experts87
has been significantly less qualified to be law-makers than the various
ALI groups have been. It is axiomatic, in a society that values representative decisionmaking, that the legitimacy of a lawmaking effort
84 Article 3 of the WlPO Convention, for example, states:
Objectives or the Organization

The objectives of the Organization are:
(i) to promote the protection of intellectual property throughout the world through cooperation among states
and, where appropriate, in collaboration with any other international organization,
(ii) to ensure administrative cooperation among the [Paris and Berne] Unions.

Leaffer, at 567. Given this mandate, WIPO's interests may be generally adverse to the purely
national interests of any country, to the extent that those national interests do not coincide with
a free-trade approach to protecting intellectual property. Cf. Penrose, at 109 ("The potential costs
and gains associated with an international extension of the patent system will be evaluated differently by countries in different economic positions, and still differently if one looks at them
from the point of view of the world as a whole. ").
85 In contrast, "a reporter [of the AU] ... must stand out to the country as generally recognized among members of the legal profession as having profound knowledge of [the] subject
[under consideration]." William Draper Lewis, Remarks at the Opening Session of the AU,
reprinted in Account of the Proceedings of the Organization of the Institute on February 23,
1923, 1 AU Proceedings, pt. II, at 60 (1923) (hereinafter "Remarks of William Lewis"). The
national focus of the work of the AU's reporters is necessarily implicit in the AU's lawmaking
efforts.
86 The Notes in Industrial Property, supra, n.4, list the persons who attended each meeting of
experts. WlPO History, WIPO Doc. No. PLT/DC/5, summarizes the participation by organizations in the meetings. The organizations represented at the WIPO negotiations that this article
considers to have "a primarily United States character" are the American Bar Association (ABA),
the American Intellectual Property Law Association (AIPLA), the Center for Advanced Study
and Research on Intellectual Property (CASRIP), Intellectual Property Owners, Inc. (IPO), and
the New York Patent, Trademark and Copyright Law Association (NYPTCLA). The large majority of the persons who attended the WI PO meetings did not represent United States interests.
87 Readers should be aware that this article uses the term "U.S. expert" differently than does
WIPO. WI PO uses the term to refer only to those persons who have attended as members of an
official delegation of the U.S. Government. Although mechanisms do exist for including private
individuals in the official negotiating delegations of the United States, see Public Notice No. 655,
44 Fed. Reg. 17846 (March 23, 1979), the PTO has generally not used this mechanism to
supplement the official delegations of the United States to the various WI PO meetings. See infra,
n.103. The PTO is believed to have largely foregone use of this mechanism in the general hope
that concerned individuals and groups would attend the WIPO meetings independently.
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depends at least in part on how widespread the participation in that
effort has been. 88 The founders of the ALI recognized this explicitly.89 As a result, the ALI includes members of diverse elements of
the legal profession within the various bodies that review its Restatement efforts.
The ALI's effort to create the Restatement of Unfair Competition
illustrates this commitment. The ALI commissioned the creation of
the Restatement of Unfair Competition in 1981.90 It selected as Reporter for the project Robert Denicola, Professor of Law at the University of Nebraska. 91 In addition, the ALI designated 19 persons to
act as Advisers to the effort.92 That group included not only leading
members of the practicing bar knowledgeable in the field of unfair
competition,93 but also seven law school professors prominent in the
area. 94 In addition, it included Judges Newman and Oakes of the
United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, and thenJudge, now Chief Judge Nies of the Federal Circuit. An additional
37 lawyers, judges and academics formed the effort's Members Consultative Group.95 The Council of the ALI consists of approximately
50 persons,96 while the ALI itself has approximately 2,500 membern.~

.

The U.S. experts who have appeared before WIPO, in contrast,
have been far less representative. A very large majority of those
persons have been either employees of the PTO or patent attorneys
practising in corporations or large private law firms. Only three have
88 See, e.g., the sources cited supra, n.62.
89 See, e.g., Report on the Establishment of the ALI, 1 ALI Proceedings, part I, at 29-40
("[A]ny restatement of the law to acquire authority necessary to enable it to accomplish results
of importance, must be undertaken by an organization representative of all branches of the legal
profession ...• No existing legal organization has the[se] characteristics ... ").
90 E.g., Perlman, 80 Trademark Rep. at 464; Edelman, 81 Trademark Rep. at 554.
91 Perlman, 80 Trademark Rep. at 464.
92 Tentative Draft No.1.
93 Included, for example, were Jerome Gilson, author of the multiple·volume treatise Trademark Protection and Practice (1992), and William M. Borchard, author of Trademarks and the
Arts (1989).
94 They were, in alphabetical order, Ralph S. Brown, Yale Law School; Benjamin Kaplan,
Harvard University Law School; Edmund Kitch, University of Virginia School of Law; David
Lange, Duke University School of Law, J. Thomas McCarthy, University of San Francisco Law
School; Harvey S. Perlman, Nebraska College of Law; and Charles Alan Wright, University of
Texas School of Law.
95 Tentative Draft No. 1.
96 Perlman, 80 Trademark Rep. at 463.
97 ALI Bylaws 11.2, 1992 ALI Annual Report at 63.

HeinOnline -- 74 J. Pat. & Trademark Off. Soc’y 800 1992

November 1992

Patent Harmonization Protectionism, and Legislation

801

been academics. 98 Not one has been a member of the Judiciary. In
fact, a combined total of only fifty-five U.S. experts of any sort have
participated in the twelve WIPO meetings. 99
One can also wonder how effective these experts have been.
Common sense suggests that a person will be of more assistance to
a lawmaking effort if his or her participation in the effort has been
consistent. loo Stated negatively, a person's ability to affect the outcome of the effort should be smaller if that person's participation has
been limited. Where the subject matter under consideration is complex, and therefore more difficult to grasp, the correlation should be
stronger.
The ALI effort appears to fare well by this criterion. By March
22, 1991, when the ALI issued Tentative Draft No.3 of the Restatement, the number of Advisors to the project had grown to 25 and
the number of Consultative Members had grown to 106.101 More
significantly, not a single one of the original Advisors had left the
98 Donald Chisum, Professor, University of Washington; Albert Tramposch, Associate Professor, John Marshall Law School; William Hennessey, Professor, Franklin Pierce Law Center.
William Fryer III, Professor, University of Baltimore School of Law, is reported to have attended
4 WIPO meetings, but as a representative of an international interest group rather than one with
a primarily United-States focus.
99 These statistics and those in the immediately following discussion have been compiled from
the Notes published in Industrial Property. See supra, nA.
It appears, in addition, that meaningful participation in the WlPO negotiations has not extended
very far beyond this small group. WIPO's Committee of Experts met from July 1985 to November
1990 at an average of once every five months. See Kirk, 50 Albany L.J. at 605 (describing WI PO
as "pushing" the harmonization negotiations "on a fast track"). The Committee appears to have
set the topics for each meeting no earlier than the preceding meeting. See, e.g., Note on the Third
Session, 1997 Indus. Prop. at 207-08; Note on the Fourth Session, 1988 Indus. Prop. at 183,
185-186; Note on the Second Part of the Fifth Session, 1989 Indus. Prop. at 59-60, 62. WIPO's
International Bureau, moreover, which acted as Secretariat at the negotiations, often did not
publish summaries of meetings for 2-3 months. See generally the Notes of the WI PO meetings
published in Industrial Property, cited supra, nA. It therefore would have been extremely difficult,
if not outright impossible, for the United States interest groups to formulate any consensus on
the relevant issues in time for each meeting, or even to meaningfully inform their constituencies.
See, e.g., Minutes of the 1991 Midwinter Meeting of the Council of the ABA Section of Patent,
Trademark and Copyright Law, ABA-PTC, 1990-91 Annual Report, 23, 25 (reporting statement
by William Brunet that the short time period between WlPO's issuance of the draft treaty and
the scheduled beginning of the diplomatic conference "presents a timing problem"); Fryer III,
72 JPTOS at 246 (noting lack of time to prepare for WlPO meeting and need for interest groups
to act" immediately"). It appears, in fact, that the International Bureau of WIPO at times placed
items on the agenda for a meeting and issued explanatory reports only after the conclusion of the
last preceding meeting. See, e.g., Note on the Second Session, 1986 Indus. Prop. at 311;
100 See, e.g., Statement of William Lewis, 1 ALI Proceedings, part II, at 60-61 (emphasizing
need for "systematic and regular attendance" by participants in ALI restatement efforts).
101 Tentative Draft No.3.
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effort; all of the original members were still present. 102 Reports indicate that the attendance of individual Advisors at the ALI's meetings was extremely regular. Meetings reportedly drew over 80%
~ttendance, and a majority of the Advisors have attended every meetmg.
The attendance <;>f individual U.S. experts at the WIPO negotiations, in contrast, has been sporadic rather-than regular. On average,
only 12.7 U.S. experts were present at each WIPO meeting. Thus,
the average representative of United States interests attended only 2.8
of the 12 WIPO meetings. The pattern is even more pronounced when
the participation of employees of the PTO are excluded from the
calculations. 103 Forty-one such non-PTO experts have attended the
WIPO meetings,I04 thus presenting an average attendance of only 8.4
experts per meeting and 2.5 meetings per expert. !Os No single U.S.
expert, whether associated with the PTO or not, is reported to have
attended all the WIPO meetings. In fact, all but seven U.S. experts
~re reported to have each attended less than half of the WIPO meetmgs.
All of this raises important questions about the WIPO negotiations. As a group, for example, our representatives may have been
102 One Advisor, Professor Perlman, was named a second Reporter and therefore relinquished
his assignment as an Advisor.
103 The statistics reported in the text at this point assume that all members of the official
delegations of the United States to the various meetings of the Committee of Experts were
employees of the PTO. This is not entirely correct. Reportedly, some of the persons who attended
as part of these official delegations were not PTO employees. Statement of Manbeck, supra, n.4
(asserting that private sector representatives and two congressional staff members were included
in official delegations of the United States). The PTO, however, is not known to have published
statements detailing the identity of the various participants in the delegations. See supra, n.87.
The Notes in Industrial Property identify the participants at each meeting of the Committee of
Experts by name, but not title. The Note concerning the Diplomatic Conference does identify the
attendees by title, and so it has been possible to separate the PTO and non-PTO employees in
that group individually.
In any event, the significance of this difficulty appears to be minimal, as five PTO employees
were responsible for a strong majority of appearances in the official delegations. (Of the 51 total
official appearances at the meetings that are not known to involve non-PTO employees, 36
appearances, or 71 %, were attributable to these five employees.)
104 This tabulation does not include the attendance of the Honorable Harry Manbeck, who
attended one WlPO meeting as a private expert before being appointed Commissioner of Patents
and Trademarks. Thereafter, he is reported to have attended two additional meetings in his capacity
as Commissioner.
105 Fourteen PTO experts appeared a total of 51 times, yielding an average attendance of 4.3
PTO experts per meeting and 3.6 meetings per PTO expert.
In fact, the actual attendance rates may be even more disparate, as the non-PTO experts from
the United States are reported to have seldom attended entire meetings. Fryer III, 72 JPTOS at
244.
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too alike to bring a varied expertise to bear. One can legitimately
wonder, moreover, whether they have attended consistently enough
to be effective. In short, the Patent Harmonization Treaty may not
be the work of the most qualified set of lawmakers we might have
provided.
Additionally, it is entirely possible that optimizing our patent
system requires more than balancing the needs of corporations, the
PTO, and patent attorneys from large law firms.106 Laws derive their
authority from a consensus among all members of society. Yet, only
limited constituencies have participated before WIPO. 10 7 The WIPO
negotiations may therefore be exceeding the consensus in this country
that actually exists concerning harmonization, rendering the effort
socially invalid. 108
III. LEGISLATING HARMONIZATION

Congress' recent introduction of legislation 109 may open the process
of patent harmonization and alleviate some of these difficulties. Through
hearings and other input, a wider range of persons may be able to
participate in the law-making effort. The proceedings will also be
more widely available to the United States public, thus making the
process more visible in this country. Perhaps most importantly, the
issues are now clearly in the hands of accountable decisionmakers.
This same step, however, may have exacerbated concerns over
another fundamental aspect of harmonization. Congress' introduction
106 See, e.g., Penrose, at 115 (describing as "defective" the use of "opinions of business
men, patent agents, and other interested persons" as the basis for determining optimal protection
of foreign patentees). Arguably, since the country as a whole provides the increased wealth that
patents transfer to their owners, see supra, n.28, considering only the interests of patent holders
is necessarily incomplete. As another example, large users of the patent system may stand to
receive disproportionately larger benefits from some proposed provisions of the Patent Harmonization Treaty than will the country as a whole. See, e.g., infra, n.51 (discussing grace period
as example).
107 At the very least, the pattern of participation by U.S. experts in the WIPO negotiations
suggests that the PTO has had a large, if not dominant, role in representing U.S. interests there.
See Remarks of Kirk, 1991 AlP LA Bull., at 442-43 (noting lack of input to the PTO from other
sources prior to the diplomatic conference). The PTO, however, is itself an agency with inherently
limited perspective and expertise. See generally Moy, Judicial Deference to the PTO's Interpretations of the Patent Law, 74 JPTOS 406, 426-35 (1992) and sources cited therein. It may be
particularly unwise to rely upon that agency's judgments as to how the interests of the United
States should be best protected. The PTO itself seems to appreciate this implicit limitation on its
negotiating authority. Remarks of Kirk, 1991 AIPLA Bull. at 442-43.
108 The recent difficulties of the European Community with ratification of the Treaty of
Maastricht may provide another example of a treaty negotiation whose course has exceeded its
underlying social mandate. See infra, n.138.
109 See supra, n.6.

HeinOnline -- 74 J. Pat. & Trademark Off. Soc’y 803 1992

804

R. Carl Moy

JPTOS

of legislation has cemented the harmonization lawmaking effort in
this country into a legislative, civil-law model and away from the
model of common-law development. As presently contemplated, a
harmonized set of United States patent laws will be created all at
once, simultaneously, through essentially a single lawmaking effort.
The difficulty with this is that the United States has never before
used such a mechanism to design its patent laws. Practically every
major facet of United States patent law was developed with the aid
of significant common-law input. For example, sections 102(a) , llO
102(e), 11l 102(g) , 112 103,113 and 104114 of Title 35 all essentially
repeat legal rules whose contours were each originally explored through
a series of case-law decisions over an extended period of time. Even
the 1952 Patent Act 1l5 was largely an effort to restate, rather than
recreate, the law of patents as it then existed. 116 Some important legal
110 The text of section 102(a) appears supra, n.23. Related case decisions include Pennock v.
Dialogue, 27 U.S. 1 (1829); and Gayler v. Wilder, 51 U.S. 477 (1850). See generally 1 Chisum,
Patents § 3.05. The early history of the novelty requirement stretches back to the colonial period
and early European practice. See generally Bugbee.
111 Section 102(e) provides:
§ 1112. Conditlens for patentability; novelty and loss or right to patent. A person shall be entitled to a
patent unless·

(e) the invention was first described in a patent granted on an application for patent by another filed in the
United States before the invention thereof by the applicant for patent. or on an international application by
another who has fulfilled the requirements of paragraphs (1), (2). and (4) of section 371(c) of this title before
the invention thereof by the applicant for patent[.)

The prior caselaw decisions include Alexander Milburn Co. v. Davis-Bournonville Co., 270
U.S. 390 (1926), and Hazeltine v. Brenner, 382 U.S. 252 (1965).
112 The text of section 102(g) appears supra, n.25. Related caselaw decisions include Bedford
v. Hunt, 3 Fed. Cas. 37 (C.C.Mass. 1817) and Sydeman vs. Thoma, 141 O.G. 866; 32 App.
D.C. 362 (D.C. Ct. App. 1909). This area of the law can still be said to be under substantial
development by caselaw. See, e.g., Paulik v. Rizkalla, 760 F.2d 1270 (Fed. Cir. 1985).
113 The first paragraph of section 103 reads as follows:
§ 103. Conditions for patentability; non-obvlous subject·malter
A patent may not be obtained though the invention is not identically disclosed or described as set forth in
section 102 of this title. if the differences between the subject matter sought to be patented and the prior art are
such that the subject matter as a whole would have been obvious at the time the invention was made to one of
ordinal)' skill in the art to which the subject matter pertains. Patentability shall not be negatived by the manner
in which the invention was made.

Related court decisions include Hotchkiss v. Greenwood, 11 How. 258 (1851). See generally
Kitch, E., Graham v. John Deere Co.: New Standards for Patents, 1966 S.Ct. Rev. 293.
114 See supra, nn.25, 27.
115 Act of July 19, 1952, Ch. 950, 66 Stat. 792.
116 See generally Federico, P.J., Commentary on the New Patent Act, at 6-10, reprinted in
Title 35, U.S.C.A. (1954 ed.).
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rules, such as the Doctrine of Equivalents,117 have never even been
codified at all.
Viewed historically, then, those who favor harmonization thus
have taken upon themselves an enormous and unprecedented task:
the instantaneous recreation of the U.S. patent system. Harmonization
on the scale now being contemplated 118 will require us to discern and
address a host of intricate, specific rules of substantive patent law.
For example, would removing the territorial restrictions of Sections
102(g) and 104 also require us to delete the territorial restrictions in
Sections 102(a) and 102(b)?119 What will be the resulting effect of
considering oral and public~use disclosures in foreign countries to be
prior art?120 What will be the impact of disregarding private offers
for sale in determining novelty?121 Do the economic arguments in
favor of considering "secret" activities to be prior art outweigh the
Europeans' desire to retain their current practice?122 Can harmoni~
zation occur when the various countries that are part of the effort use
radically different claiming theories in their national patent prac~
117 See, e.g., Graver Tank & Mfg. Co. v. Linde Air Products Co., 339 U.S. 605 (1950); and
Wilson Sporting Goods Co. v. David Geoffrey & Associates, 904 F.2d 677 (Fed. Cir. 1990).
118 It may be worthwhile to note that the WIPO harmonization effort originated from other
projects with much more modest goals than the far-reaching attempt at harmonization that is now
embodied in the Patent Harmonization Treaty. According to WIPO, it grew out of a relatively
simple effort to obtain an international agreement to include a grace period in national patent
laws. WIPO History, WI PO Doc. No. PLT/DC/5, at par. 2-3. Officials of the PTO have asserted
that it grew out of an effort to coordinate the operations of the patent offices of the United States,
Japan, and Europe. See, e.g., Kirk, 50 Albany L. Rev. at 602.
119 See supra, n.25.
120 Resolution 102-8 of the ABA-PTC, reprinted in ABA-PTC, 1990-91 Annual Report, at
43, opposes the consideration of "non-patented and non-published foreign disclosures as prior
art."
121 Under Article 11 of the Patent Harmonization Treaty, Basic Proposal, WIPO Doc. No.
PLT/DC/3 at 21, confidential offers to sell would not destroy novelty. Report of William J.
Brunet, Chair, Committee 102 (International Patent Treaties and Laws) to the Council of the
ABA-PTC, Jan. 20, 1991, reprinted in ABA-PTC, 1990-91 Annual Report, 27. Resolution 1027 of the ABA-PTC, reprinted in id. at 43, would oppose such a change.
122 An upcoming work by the present author will address the economic considerations involved
in the treatment of "secret" events as prior art.
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tices?123 Is harmonization even a realistic outcome from a treaty that
addresses only substantive patent law, and not the differing litigation
and discovery practices of the various countries?124 Given our historical use of common-law methods to develop consensus in patent
law, we may simply be unable as a society to act properly on the
specifics of harmonization via legislative mechanisms.
Recent evidence shows how difficult such action may be. One
of the most recent legislative lawmaking efforts in United States
patent law enhanced process-patent protection via the Patent Law
Amendments of 1988. 125 Even this limited law-making action produced a set of provisions that are hugely complex, contradictory, and
largely ineffective. Another recent legislative effort partially overturned In re Bass 126 via the Patent Law Amendments of 1984.127 That
effort inserted into Section 103 a second paragraph that excludes from
the definition of "prior art" certain activities falling within the cri123 National patent claiming practices generally are classified as either "central" or "peripheral." The United States' claiming practice is peripheral. See generally, e.g., Deller, A.W.,
Patent Claims, §§ 5-10 (2d ed. 1971 & Supp. 1992) (hereinafter "Deller on Patent Claims").
Other countries, however, use central claiming practice to a greater degree than does the United
States. See, e.g., Tanabe & Wegner, Japanese Patent Law, pt. I, 58 JPOS 565 (1976). ct.
Protocol on the Interpretation of Article 69 of the European Patent Convention, Oct. 5, 1973,
reprinted in Leaffer, at 169 (attempting to standardize European claiming practice as between
extreme peripheral and central theories). The choice of claiming theory impacts the operation of
various other legal doctrines of patent law, notably the doctrine of equivalents. E.g., Deller on
Patent Claims, at §§ 11-12; Wegner, Equitable Equivalents: Weighing the Equities to Detennine
Patent Infringement in Biotechnology and Other Emerging Technologies, 18 Rutgers Comp. &
Tech. L.J. 1 (1992).
124 Article 2(3) of the Paris Convention expressly reserves "[t)he provisions of the laws of
each countries of the Union relating to judicial and administrative procedure and to jurisdiction,"
Leaffer, at 21, and the Patent Harmonization Treaty contains no express provisions on such
subjects. The practice in foreign countries regarding these matters, such as for example civil
discovery practice, can be quite different from that in the United States. E.g., Kaplan, von Mehren
& Schaefer, Phases of Gennan Civil Procedure, pt. I, 71 Harv. L. Rev. 1193, 1246-47 (1958)
(discussing German civil discovery). The proposal of the United States in the now-stalled GAIT
negotiations did contain provisions relating to minimum discovery mechanisms in member countries. See Richards, 72 JPTOS at 921.
125 Process Patents Amendment Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 418, 102 Stat. 1563, 1564·6, 100th
Cong., 2d Sess. (1988). See generally, Law, Glenn, Note: Liability Under the Process Patent
Amendments Act of 1988 for the Use of the Patented Process Outside the United States, 60 Geo.
Wash. L. Rev. 245 (1991).
126 474 F.2d 1276 (CCPA 1973). Other related decisions are In re Clemens, 622 F.2d 1029
(CCPA 1980), and Kimberly-Clark Corp. v. Johnson & Johnson, 745 F.2d 1437 (Fed. Cir. 1984).
127 Patent Law Amendments Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 622, § 103,98 Stat. 3383, 3384, 98th
Cong., 2d Sess. (1984).
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teria of Sections 102(f) and 102(g).I28 In an omission that is conceptually unsound, however, the new paragraph makes no mention of
activities defined by Section 102(e).129 Another series of recent legislative efforts created the provisions in Title 35 that pertain to the
extension of the terms of certain patents. 130 The Federal Circuit has
already found them to have created a "windfall" for a particular
class of patent owners "that was probably not contemplated by Congress. "131 In addition, the Supreme Court has already been called
upon to address an ambiguity in their language. 132
On the whole, then, recent experience does not speak well of
our ability to legislate rules of patent law. Observers can therefore
be rightfully uncomfortable with efforts to make numerous, fundamental changes in the patent system of the United States rapidly via
legislation. 133
The prior experiences of other countries with patent-law harmonization, moreover, may not be a source of comfort to the United
States. The most extensive experiment in patent-law harmonization
to date has occurred in Western Europe, where a series of conventions
have required member nations of the European Community to adopt

128 That paragraph provides:
§ 103 Conditions Cor patentability; non-obvlous subject matter

Subject mailer developed by another person, which qualifies as prior art only under subsection (I) or (g) of
section 102 of this title, shall not preclude patentability under this section where the subject mailer and the
claimed invention were, at the time the invention was made, owned by the same person or subjcctto an obligation
of assignment to the same person.

129 See generally In re Bartleld, 925 F.2d 450 (Fed. Cir. 1991). The AIPLA has considered
recommending that Congress amend the provision to include reference to section 102(e). Report
of the Patent Law Committee at the 1990 AIPLA Midwinter Meeting, 1990 AIPLA Bull. 322
(Jan.-Mar.).
130 Drug Price Competition and Patent Term Restoration Act of 1984, Pub. L. 417, 98th
Cong., 2d Sess., 98 Stat 1585 (1984), amended by the Generic Animal Drug and Patent Term
Restoration Act, Pub. L. 670, 100th Cong., 2d Sess., 102 Stat. 3971 (1988).
131 Hoechst Aktiengesellschaft v. Quigg, 917 F.2d 522, 529 (Fed. Cir. 1990).
132 Eli Lilly and Co. v. Medtronic, Inc., 496 U.S. 661 (1990) (addressing ambiguity in section
271(e)(I».
133 Professor Malchup, for example, made the following observations after concluding that
the overall economic consequences of the patent system were too difficult to quantify:
If one does not know whether a system "as a whole" (in contrast to certain features of it) is good or bad,
the safest "policy conclusion" is to "muddle through" -either with it, if one has long lived with it, or without
it, if one has long lived without it. 11 would be irresponsible, on the basis of our present knowledge of its
economic consequences, to recommend instituting one. But since we have had a patent system for a long time,
it would be irresponsible, on the basis of our present knowledge, to recommend abolishing it.

Patent Study No. 15, at 80. The same cautious approach is arguably wisest in evaluating whether
to join the current harmonization effort.
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uniform patent laws.134 Nearly all these member countries, however,
operate under systems of civil law .135 They therefore have profoundly
different values and habits with regard to law-making mechanisms
than we do - values and habits that are aligned to the mechanisms
of the current harmonization effort much more closely than are OUTS. 136
Legislating entire bodies of law at once is- for them the norm, not the
exception as it is in United States patent law.
Perhaps more importantly, the member nations of the EC have
already made decisions in favor of internationalism that are much
more fundamental and far-reaching than whether to harmonize their
patent laws. They have broadly committed to the concept of freetrade within a single, European market,137 and are adopting uniform
134 Strassbourg Convention of 1963, reprinted in Jacob, app. CS (requiring the adoption of
similar rules of substantive patent law); European Patent Convention, reprinted in Leaffer, at 143
(creating single examination proceeding to obtain national patents in member countries); Community Patent Convention, reprinted in 1 Sweet & Maxwell, Encyclopedia of United Kingdom
& European Patent Law, 5001 (1992) (not yet in force) (providing for single patent granting
rights in all member countries). See generally, e.g., Paterson, G., The European Patent System,
15-23 (1992) (hereinafter "Paterson"); Ulmer, 2 International Encyclopedia of Comparative Law,
ch. 1, at 36-38.
135 Of the thirteen countries that are signatory to the EPC, for example, only the United
Kingdom has a significant common law tradition.
136 For a general comparative discussion of law-making mechanisms in civil-law jurisdictions,
see, e.g., Dainow, Joseph, The Civil Law and the Common Law: Some Points of Comparison,
15 Am. J. Comp. L. 419, 424 (1966-67) ("Generally, in civil law jurisdictions the main source
or basis of the law is legislation, and large areas are codified in a systematic manner.... Although
in the form of statutes duly enacted by the proper legislative procedure, these codes are quite
different from ordinary statutes ..... A code is not a list of special rules for specific situations;
it is, rather, a body of general principles carefully arranged and closely integrated .•.. A code
purports to be comprehensive and to encompass the entire subject matter, not in the details but
in the principles, and to provide answers for questions which may arise. ").
137 Treaty on Establishing the European Economic Community, as signed at Rome, 1957
(hereinafter the "Treaty of Rome"). The Treaty of Rome commits its members, for example, to
allow goods, arts. 9-37, and persons, services and capital, arts. 48-70, to move freely between
member countries.
Some in Europe have expressly recognized the relationship between these broader trade agreements and the harmonization of European patent laws. See, e.g., Paterson, at 16 (noting that,
prior to the formation of the Strassbourg Convention, "the existence of separate national patents
for the same invention was seen as a mechanism whereby trade barriers could be maintained,
contrary to the newly emerging European interest in a common market").

HeinOnline -- 74 J. Pat. & Trademark Off. Soc’y 808 1992

November 1992

Patent Harmonization Protectionism, and Legislation

809

laws in many subject-matter areas outside of patent law. 138 The United
States, in contrast, has essentially none of these relationships with
the countries that are potential parties to the current harmonization
treaty.139 There is room to wonder, therefore, what if any of the
European experience with harmonization will apply to the United
States under the current effort in WIPO.
IV.

CONCLUSION

I suggest that at least some of the current resistance to harmonization is the result of two difficult, interrelated problems. The current efforts at harmonization are based on internationalist policy goals
that the United States has not embraced. To harmonize we will therefore have to make changes to the basic legal rules of our patent
system. More importantly, responsible lawmaking would seem to
require that the adoption of harmonized legal rules follow, and be
dependent on, the prior formation of a new social consensus as to
the nature of the patent system in this country.
It is a serious question whether the current law-making processes
of harmonization can create such a new consensus. The debate over
harmonization needs to explicitly recognize the existence of much
138 The Treaty of Rome commits its members to cooperate in many areas, such as economic
and monetary policy, arts. 102A-116, and social policy. Arts. 117-19.
It is interesting to note that the difficulties the Europeans are experiencing with deeper unification bear similarities to the law-making difficulties that are under discussion here. The governments of the twelve nations of the EC have signed the Maastricht Treaty on European Union.
Treaty on European Union, as signed at Maastricht, Feb. 7, 1992. The Maastricht Treaty would
provide for measures of unity well beyond free trade, such as a common currency and common
defense. Id. The voters of Denmark, however, have recently refused to ratify the Maastricht
Treaty, and popular sentiment for the treaty is reported to be weak in many European countries.
See, e.g., Roger Cohen, European Community Left Askew After Danes Say No to Integration,
N.Y. Times, June 4, 1992, at AI; Craig Whitney, Denmark's Signal: A 'No' to Europe Points
Up Anxieties on Sovereignty, N.Y. Times, June 4, 1992, at A6. According to Cohen,
[m]uch of [the] criticism [of the treaty] surfaced only after the accord was reacheq in Maastricht. It appears that
many of the European Community'S 340 million citizens were unaware of what was in the treaty and the degree
to which it represented a radical step toward union.
Certainly, many Danes complained before the vote, when the treaty was signed they had no idea what
commitment their government was making.

N.Y. Times, June 4, 1992, at A6. Accord, Make O'Break, The Economist 56 (June 13, 1992)
(noting among Irish voters the "widespread belief that the whole Maastricht process is undemocratic"); RatifICation, The Economist, 48 (June 20, 1992); Alan Riding, European Treaty
Sponsors Have a Lot to Explain.
139 The United States entered into its first free-trade agreement, with Canada, in 1988. It has
recently finished negotiating the second such agreement, the North American Free Trade Agreement, with Canada and Mexico. See, e.g., Bradsher, K., Economic Accord Reached by U.S.,
Mexico and Canada Lowering Trade Bamers, N.Y. Times, August 13, 1992. The NAFTA treaty
has not yet been ratified, and its merits are subject to considerable debate within the United States.
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broader, deeper questions than it yet has. More importantly, the very
task of harmonizing United States patent law may be unsuited to
multilateral treaty negotiations or other similar lawmaking mechanisms. Patent law in the United States is complex and textured. Fundamentally redesigning it all at once may simply be beyond our abilities.
We may be unable to acquire the necessary expertise to recognize
the many issues that are involved. Even if we can, moreover, we
may still be unable to agree on how each of those issues should be
resolved. In short, it may be impossible to subject each of the substantive issues in the current harmonization effort to a properly focused analysis.
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